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I use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) to measure the lifetime incidence
of a shift from the current income tax to a National Retail Sales Tax.  I show that the distribution
of the tax reform depends in important ways on the measure of household well being.  If annual
income is used to rank households, the tax reform looks very regressive.  When lifetime income is
used to rank households, the tax reform continues to look regressive though much less regressive
than when the annual income approach is used.  
I also consider various ways to add progressivity to the new tax system.  If a universal
rebate tied to poverty thresholds is coupled with the national sales tax, the system looks nearly as
progressive as the current income tax system when households are ranked by lifetime income. 
The universal rebate in effect exempts from the sales tax spending by individuals and families up
to the poverty threshold.  Using the poverty threshold to construct the rebate has the advantage
that larger families have more of their consumption exempt from the sales tax than do smaller
families.  I also consider a rebate of the employer and employee portions of the payroll tax. 
Because the rebate is targeted towards workers, it is not as effective at mitigating the regressivity
of the sales tax as is the universal rebate.
There are two essential messages of this paper.  First, whether we rank people by annual
or lifetime income makes a big difference when measuring the progressivity of a national sales tax. 
Second, it is relatively easy to construct a sales tax that is nearly as progressive as the current
income tax.  The universal rebate option is a good example of how one could proceed.  A flat tax means different things to different people.  Here, I mean what Meade (1978)
1
has called an R-based tax.  It is a tax on real transactions and ignores financial flows.  Thus
interest payments are not deductible by borrower nor included as income by lender.  Nor is capital
income taxed at the personal level.  The Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax and a national Value Added Tax
are both examples of a flat tax by this definition.
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I. Introduction
Dissatisfaction with the current income tax continues to generate interest in broad based
tax reform.  In particular, there is considerable interest in moving from our current income tax to
a consumption tax.  In the 104th Congress there were roughly a dozen proposals for substantive
tax reform.  The proposals fall into 3 broad categories: a Flat Tax, a Consumed Income Tax, and
a Retail Sales Tax .  A major concern with any of the broad based consumption tax proposals is
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that they are perceived to be highly regressive relative to the current income tax.  Much of this
perception follows from the idea that rich people do most of the saving and that therefore any
move to a consumption tax will release a substantial share of income from taxation.  Incidence
studies using annual income support this view; distributional tables for a shift from an income to a
consumption tax show the reform to be highly regressive (see, for example, Gale, Houser, and
Scholz (1996)).  A major problem with annual incidence studies of consumption taxes is that
lifecycle income and savings patterns distort the measured incidence of a consumption tax in a
pronounced regressive direction.  
The goal of this paper is to indicate the biases resulting from measuring the incidence of a
consumption tax using an annual incidence approach and to show incidence results for a national
retail sales tax (RST) using a lifetime income approach that I have used elsewhere (Caspersen and
Metcalf (1994)).  In addition, I consider possible variants on a broad based national sales tax to
increase progressivity.  One approach is to provide a family rebate equal to the poverty level times  More precisely, the numerator is the change in real disposable income resulting from the
2
change in the tax law.  If a new tax is imposed, the change in disposable income might occur
because prices have gone up so that a given income purchases fewer goods and services or it
might occur because wages have fallen.  In this analysis, I assume that the new tax raises product
prices rather than affecting wages or capital income.
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the sales tax rate.  A second approach is to rebate some portion of the payroll tax (both employer
and employee contribution).  This second approach is in the spirit of the family allowances
contained in the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax.  What I find is that with a lifetime incidence approach a
national sales tax is not nearly as regressive as it appears using an annual incidence approach. 
Moreover, additional progressivity can be built into the tax system.  In fact, with a universal
rebate tied to poverty thresholds, the sales tax looks nearly as progressive as the current income
tax measured by the lifetime incidence approach.
In the next section, I describe the annual and lifetime incidence approaches and why they
might differ in their conclusions.  I also survey results from previous analyses of broad based
consumption taxes.  I then describe the methodology used in this study.  Section IV presents the
results of my analysis and section V concludes.
II. How Does An Economist Measure Incidence?
An incidence analysis attempts to answer the question who bears the burden of a particular
tax.  Any attempt to evaluate the "fairness" of a tax (or a change in the tax system) requires
knowing whose disposable income is changed and by how much in response to the tax. 
Economists often refer to taxes as "regressive" or "progressive".  There is often some confusion
as to the meaning of these terms and so it is worth defining them carefully.  The definition that
most economists use relies on the average tax rate - the ratio of tax liabilities to income.   A tax is
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said to be regressive if the average tax rate falls with income.  It is proportional if the average tax   Variants on the annual approach abound.  Musgrave, Case, and Leonard (1974) arrive
3
at similar conclusions.  Ballard, Scholz, and Shoven (1987) use a CGE model to estimate the
incidence associated with the introduction of a VAT in the U.S. economy.  They find the VAT to
be regressive when introduced as a partial substitute for the individual income tax. 
  Table 8-2, page 290 of Gale, Houser, and Scholz (1996).
4
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rate is constant and it is progressive if the average tax rate rises with income.  Low income people
pay a higher (lower) fraction of their income in taxes if the tax is regressive (progressive).  
Early tax incidence studies used the results of partial or general equilibrium models to
inform judgments about relevant incidence results.  In effect, these studies used existing research
results to generate plausible assumptions about the incidence of specific taxes.  Pechman (1985)
represents the classic example of this type of research.  The time frame for analysis is one year,
and Pechman assumes that consumption taxes are passed forward and borne by consumers in
proportion to their expenditures.  Taking this approach, Pechman finds that consumption taxes
are quite regressive.    A recent study by Gale, Houser, and Scholz (1996) confirms this view.  In
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an analysis of a shift from the current income tax to a flat tax they find that the lowest income
group would see their average tax rate increase by 2.2 percentage points (81% increase) while the
highest income group would see their average tax rate decrease by 7.1 percentage points (17%
decrease).   Similarly, Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba (1996) find that there would be a
4
substantial shift in tax burden to the poor in shifting from the income tax to a retail sales tax.  
An alternative approach utilizes estimates of lifetime income as a measure of the taxpaying
unit's economic well-being.  Invoking Friedman's (1957) permanent income hypothesis as well as
life-cycle considerations, economists have long recognized that annual income may not be a very
good measure of an individual's potential to consume.  With perfect capital markets, individuals-4-
Figure 1.  Lifetime Income and
Consumption Profiles
should be grouped according to the present discounted value of earnings plus gifts received.  This
theory makes the difficulties with the
annual incidence approach readily
apparent.  People tend to earn the highest
incomes in their life around middle age
and the lowest incomes in their youth and
old age. Consequently in a cross section
(annual) analysis, lower income groups
are likely to include some young and
elderly people (as well as some people
with volatile incomes who have obtained
a low realization) who are not poor in a
lifetime sense. Similarly, higher annual income groups are likely to contain some people at the
peak of their age earnings profile for whom peak earnings are a poor measure of annual ability to
consume. 
To see why a lifetime approach makes a difference, imagine a world with identical people
with identical skills and an identical pattern of earnings over their lifetime.  Figure 1 illustrates the
lifetime income and consumption paths of a typical person in this imaginary society.  Income is
initially low and rises to a peak in the middle years. It than falls as this worker gradually cuts back
on work and enjoys more retirement leisure.  Consumption is constant over the lifetime.  In early
years individuals borrow against future income to finance consumption that exceeds income. 
Savings occurs in the middle years, first to repay borrowing from the early years and then to-5-
finance consumption in the retirement years.  In this stylized example, I'll assume that all savings
are consumed so that at death there are no assets remaining.  
Next assume that there is one person of each age in this society.  Otherwise people are
identical.  Figure 1 now has an additional interpretation.  In addition to it indicating consumption
and income patterns over an individual's lifetime, it also shows income and consumption patterns
for our society of individuals at any one point in time.  Now consider an annual incidence analysis
of a national sales tax.  Since consumption is constant across all individuals, tax payments will
also be constant.  But since income varies (based on where people are on their lifetime income
schedule), the average tax rate (taxes as a fraction of annual income) will fall as income rises.  The
tax will look very regressive.  But this is clearly wrong.  Individuals are exactly the same in this
hypothetical society and over their lifetimes will earn exactly the same amount of income and pay
exactly the same amount of taxes.  A lifetime incidence analysis will correctly conclude that this
tax is proportional.
Relative to annual income, lifetime income is more difficult to measure.  Poterba (1989,
1991) has proposed using consumption as a proxy for lifetime income, arguing that since
household consumption tends to be smoother than income, total annual consumption is likely to
be a better measure of household well-being than total annual income.  Using data on total
expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Poterba finds that excise taxes on alcohol,
tobacco, and gasoline are much less regressive than they appear when viewed in an annual income
framework.  Metcalf (1993a) has used a similar approach to analyze state and local tax systems. 
Like Poterba's findings for excise taxes, he finds that the system of state and local taxes is less
regressive when consumption is used to proxy for lifetime income.  Feenberg, Mitrusi, and-6-
Poterba (1996) also use the consumption proxy for lifetime income in a detailed analysis of a shift
from the current income tax system to a national sales tax.  This study is a much more
comprehensive study than many of the previous studies in that it considers the personal income
tax, the corporate income tax and the estate tax.  It merges data from a number of data sources to
construct a comprehensive dataset on consumption and income.  Using consumption as a proxy
for lifetime income, they find that the regressivity of the shift measured using annual income is
substantially reduced and that the shift can in fact be progressive with sufficient efforts to add
progressivity to the system (lump sum grants or exempting certain categories of spending from
the tax base).  
The advantage of the approach taken by Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba (hereafter FMP)
is its simplicity.  Distributional tables can be constructed using data readily available in a single
year.  The disadvantage is that current consumption may not be a very good proxy for lifetime
income.  In previous work I have shown (Caspersen and Metcalf (1994)) that distributional tables
for consumption taxes using current consumption as a proxy for lifetime income underestimate the
regressivity of a consumption tax.  This is because the current consumption approach assumes
that consumption is roughly constant over the lifetime.  However, consumption exhibits the same
kind of "hump" that income does over the lifetime (though not as pronounced).  The same kinds
of errors that occur when ranking people by annual income persist to an extent when people are
ranked by consumption.  Thus we should view the FMP results as upper bounds on the
progressivity of a shift from income to consumption taxation.  Since these are upper bounds, we
cannot conclude from their analysis that the retail sales tax shift with the progressive elements
they model (e.g. lump sum rebates) is actually a progressive shift.   The wage rate is used here as a measure of annual endowment so that leisure and the
5
utility associated with it can be incorporated into the model.  
   Lyon and Schwab (1991) use a similar approach to estimate the incidence of excise
6
taxes on alcohol and tobacco.  They find little difference between the annual and lifetime approach
for cigarettes but find alcohol taxes to be substantially less regressive in the life-cycle analysis.
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One approach to resolving this problem is to use an explicit computable general
equilibrium lifecycle model to investigate the incidence of tax reforms.  The work by Fullerton and
Rogers (1991 and 1993) is perhaps the best work in this area.  The authors first estimate age-
wage profiles. Using data on individuals from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they regress
the wage rate on time, the age of each individual, the age squared, the age cubed, and various 
demographic variables.   The results of this regression describe how a person's earnings potential
5
changes over time as a consequence of age and the other factors.  Once these profiles are
determined, each person in the data set can be assigned a measure of his or her respective lifetime
income.  This is calculated by summing up the discounted values of the areas under the estimated
age-wage profiles for each person.  
Once individuals are categorized by the present value of lifetime wage potential, Fullerton
and Rogers then proceed to re-estimate profiles for each group and to calculate tax incidence
estimates based on the age-income profiles and the lifetime income measurements.  They find that
both the corporate and individual income taxes appear to be less progressive in a life-cycle
framework, while sales and excise taxes appear to be less regressive.  It is also noted that, despite
these changes, the overall incidence of the U.S. tax system seems to be about the same as it has
been estimated under an annual income framework.   
6
Fullerton and Rogers present the most careful analysis of lifetime tax incidence to date.   None of these models consider in any detail the dynamics of growth and capital
7
accumulation following a tax reform.  Thus the incidence results do not explicitly take into
account the impact of tax reform on economic growth.
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Their most recent paper (1996) considers the steady-state intragenerational incidence of a shift
from the current income tax to a proportional VAT (with and without various progressive
features).  A proportional VAT reform continues to be regressive with welfare losses of 4.3% for
the lowest lifetime income group and welfare gains of 10% for the highest lifetime income group
(Table 9-4, page 334).  A $10,000 household consumption exemption generates progressivity at
the lower end of the income distribution (roughly through the 6  decile) but the tax continues to
th
be regressive in the higher deciles .
7
 Note that there are different "lifetime" experiments that one can analyze.  As Poterba
(1993) points out, one can look at lifetime tax burdens and/or lifetime income.  Fullerton and
Rogers (1996) look at the lifetime tax burden relative to lifetime income whereas Poterba (1989,
1991) and Metcalf (1993a, 1993b) look at annual tax burdens relative to lifetime income.  The
latter approach addresses the question of the burden of a particular year's taxes when households
are classified by a measure of economic well-being that is less prone to measurement error than
annual income.  The annual tax/lifetime income approach is taken in this paper.  Strictly speaking,
one cannot compare the results from a lifetime tax/lifetime income analysis (e.g. Fullerton and
Rogers) to an annual tax/lifetime income analysis such as this one.
While the approach used by Fullerton and Rogers is appealing on many grounds, it is
computationally intensive and does not provide all the information that policy makers care about. 
Looking at steady state lifetime tax burdens is important but the distribution of annual tax-9-
liabilities is also of great interest in a world in which tax laws change with some frequency and
policy makers face the electorate every few years.  The approach I use in this paper uses readily
accessible information from annual data similar (and in some cases identical) to data used by FMP
to distribute the tax reform but uses a measure of lifetime income constructed from lifetime
earnings profiles.  Appendix A discusses how I measure lifetime income.  In the next section, I
measure the incidence of a shift from an income tax to a national sales tax.
III. Analysis of Tax Reform Using 1994 Data
I consider a shift from an income tax to a national sales tax using data from the 1994
Consumer Expenditure Survey.  Before turning to the data, I consider what tax rate is required if
the United States shifted from the current income tax to a broad based retail sales tax.  According
to the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, income taxes in 1994 amounted to $688.5
billion with roughly 80% of the revenue coming from the personal income tax (see Table 1
below).  Personal consumption expenditures in that year amounted to $4698.7 billion.  Not all of
personal consumption should be included in the tax base.  First, I must subtract indirect taxes
from personal consumption.  I also assume that the consumption value of owner occupied
housing, the imputed value of financial services, non-profit activities, and food produced and
consumed on farms would not be taxed.  The figure for owner occupied housing is net of
spending on new housing (and improvements).  In other words, I adjust the housing number to
include the cost of a new house while excluding the imputed consumption value of the housing  This is an example of the tax prepayment approach to durables.  Rather than try to tax
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the consumption of housing over its lifetime, we tax the purchase of the house itself under the
assumption that the price of a house reflects the present discounted value of the stream of
consumption services that the owner will receive over its lifetime.




services that result from purchasing the house.   Next, I include net foreign spending in the United
8
States in the sales tax base .   The first column of Table 1 indicates that the adjusted tax base
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would be $3.8 trillion and a tax rate of 18.2% would be required to raise as much money as the
personal and corporate income tax did in 1994.  If non-profit activities and imputed financial
services are included in the tax base, the rate can be lowered to 16.5%.   In the analysis I do
below, I include non-profit activities in the tax base to the extent that they show up as a
component of spending by households.  However, I do not include imputed financial services in
the base.-11-
Table 1. Aggregate Consumption
 and Taxation
Current Income Tax
Personal Income Tax 544.5
Corporate Income Tax 144.0
Total Income Tax 688.5




Adjustments to Personal Consumption
Expenditures:
Indirect Taxes (266.9) (266.9)
Owner Occupied Housing (280.2) (280.2)
Imputed Financial Services (146.0) 0.0
Non-Profit Activities (236.6) 0.0
Farm Food (0.5) (0.5)
Net Foreign Spending 19.8 19.8
Consumption Tax Base 3,788.3 4,170.9
Retail Sales Tax Rate 18.2% 16.5%
I use micro data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to distribute the income and sales
taxes.  There are 3 adjustments I must make to the CES data before I can analyze the tax reform. 
First, the CES reports out of pocket medical expenditures and ignores spending on a consumer's
behalf by HMOs and insurance companies.  I use data from the National Medical Expenditure-12-




1 2 3 4 5
1 50.1 21.2 17.0 5.9 5.9
2 21.4 27.2 22.5 18.7 10.3
3 13.0 24.5 20.6 23.1 18.8
4 9.1 18.9 19.8 27.1 25.2
5 6.3 8.6 19.4 25.9 39.9
Survey (NMES) to attribute medical spending to individual households to replace the health
spending reported in the CES.  Second, I make adjustments to the CES income and consumption
categories to match aggregate numbers in the National Income and Product Accounts.  Third I
attribute corporate tax payments to individual households using a methodology developed by
Feldstein (1988).  I provide details on  these adjustments in Appendix B.
Before turning to distributional tables for a shift from income taxation to a retail sales tax,
I consider the importance of the lifetime income correction.  Table 2 presents a cross tabulation of
lifetime income quintiles by annual income quintiles.  The table entries are proportions of
households in a given annual income quintile that fall into each lifetime income quintile.  Thus the
entry in the top left corner of the table is the fraction of households in the lowest annual income
quintile with lifetime income in the lowest quintile.  This table shows that there is considerable
variation among the quintiles based on annual and lifetime income.  For example, nearly 30% of  The size of the tax shift for this lowest income decile indicates one of the problems of
10
the annual income approach.  It tends to magnify average tax rates as income is likely to be poorly
measured and also low relative to consumption.  It is for this reason that Pechman (1985)
dropped the bottom half of the lowest income decile from his analysis.  The median change in tax
rate for this decile is 32.9%.  Except for the lowest decile, median and mean tax rates are fairly
similar.
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the households in the lowest quintile for annual income have lifetime income in the 3rd or higher
lifetime quintile.  More striking is the fact that 15% of the households in the highest annual
income quintile are in the lowest 40% of the distribution of lifetime income.  The correlation
between annual and lifetime income quintiles in the sample is .45.  Based on Table 2, I should
expect considerable difference between distributional results based on annual income rankings and
lifetime income rankings.
Section IVA - Broad Based Retail Sales Tax
My first analysis considers a shift from the current income tax to a broad based retail sales
tax.  The tax base is quite comprehensive.  Housing services are not taxed per se but are taxed at
the time of purchase of the house.  The same approach is used for other durable goods.  Medical
services are included in the tax base as are other services.  Table 3 shows the distribution of a shift
from the income tax to a broad based income tax using an annual income incidence approach. 
Households are ranked by annual income.  The second column shows the change in tax liability in
shifting from an income to a retail sales tax while the third column shows the change in average
tax rate (change in tax as a percentage of annual income).  Based on the annual income approach,
the tax reform is very regressive.  Tax liabilities increase for the bottom 70% of the income
distribution and decrease for the top 30%.  The changes are quite substantial with the lowest
income decile seeing their average tax rate increase by 64 percentage points.     Meanwhile the
10  The Suits Index is a tax-based analogue to the Gini Coefficient.  It ranges from -1 to 1
11
with negative values indicating a regressive tax and positive values a progressive tax.  The Suits
Index for the income tax that I report is not comparable to estimates of the Suits Index reported
elsewhere for the personal income tax since I attribute the corporate income tax to households in
this study.
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top decile's average tax rate falls by 7%.  Another way to measure the regressivity of the tax
reform based on annual income is to note that the Suits Index falls from 0.202 (income tax) to
-0.217 (retail sales tax) as a result of the reform.
11
Table 3. Distribution of a Broad Based
Retail Sales Tax: Annual Basis
Decile Change in Tax Change in
Liability Average Tax
Rate
1 2,516  64.3
2 2,867  24.4
3 3,044  17.4
4 2,837  11.5
5 2,386   7.3
6   870   2.3
7 1,820   3.9
8  -374  -0.6
9  -688  -0.9
10 -15,202  -7.0
Much of the regressivity of the tax reform is eliminated when I shift to a lifetime income
analysis.  Table 4 presents the results.  The variation in changes in tax liabilities across lifetime
income deciles falls markedly relative to the annual income analysis.  The reform is still regressive
- the lowest 70% of the income distribution face tax increases while the top 30% enjoy tax-15-
decreases. However the differences are not nearly as large as when measured using annual income
to rank households.  Moreover, the change in average tax rates is much smaller with the lowest
lifetime income decile facing an average increase in their average tax rate of 5.7 percentage points
while the top decile's average tax rate falls by 2 percentage points.  Ranking households by
lifetime income, the Suits Index now falls from 0.068 to -0.010 with this tax reform.
Table 4. Distribution of a Broad Based
Retail Sales Tax: Lifetime Basis
Decile Change in Change in
Tax Liability Average Tax
Rate
1 1,110   5.7
2  1,088   4.0
3     345   1.0
4     391   1.0
5     572   1.2
6     183   0.4
7     168   0.4
8   -1,269  -2.0
9    -872  -1.3
10   -1,701 -2.0
Next I explore different ways to add progressivity to a national sales tax.  One approach is
to provide a family rebate.  I model the rebate on the proposal of Burton and Mastromarco
(1996).  A second approach is to rebate payroll tax payments up to some maximum amount.  A
work related rebate makes the retail sales tax mimic in important ways the operation of the Hall-
Rabushka Flat Tax which excludes from the wage tax some amount of earned income up to a  This example rebates payroll taxes up to a maximum of $2,000 per worker.  I rebate
12
both the employer and the employee's payroll tax contribution.  For example, a worker making
$1,500 in contributions out of his paycheck would be eligible for the full $2,000 rebate since the
total contribution on her behalf is assumed to be $3,000.
  Burton and Mastromarco propose grossing up the rebate so that disposable income
13
after the rebate is brought up to the poverty threshold.  Structuring the rebate that way would not
change the distributional impact of the tax reform in any substantive way.  
-16-
maximum amount based on family size.  The size of the payroll tax rebate that I consider is related
to the amount of earnings (up to a ceiling) and the number of workers making payroll tax
contributions.  Thus a dual working couple might receive a rebate of $4,000 while a similar
couple in which one spouse does not work might receive a rebate of $2,000.
12
IVB.  A Family Rebate
Burton and Mastromarco (1996) have proposed providing universal rebates to households
equal to the poverty level to build progressivity into the tax system.  In this section, I consider the
impact of this proposal on the distribution of the retail sales tax.  Poverty thresholds for 1994
ranged from $7,107 for an elderly unrelated individual to $30,285 for a family of size 9 (see Table
5 below).  The rebate would equal the tax rate times the poverty threshold for a given family
size .  In effect, the rebate removes from the tax base an amount equal to the sum of poverty
13
thresholds for each family unit in the United States added up over all family units.  Call this
amount the aggregate rebate base.  Based on extrapolations from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey data set for 1994, the aggregate rebate base would equal $1.15 trillion.  Assuming that
non-profits and imputed financial services are included in the tax base, the revenue neutral tax rate
would rise from 16.5% to 22.8%.-17-
Table 5. Poverty Thresholds for 1994





2 persons,  $9,977
householder under age 65
2 persons,  $8,964







9 persons or more $30,285
Source: Annual Statistical Supplement: Social
Security Bulletin, 1995.
Table 6 presents annual incidence results for a broad based national sales tax with a
universal rebate based on poverty thresholds.-18-
Table 6. Distribution of a Broad Based
Retail Sales Tax with Universal Rebates:
Annual Basis
Decile Change in Tax Change in
Liability Average Tax
Rate
1  1,767    40.9
2 2,245    19.1
3  2,522  14.2
4    2,345    9.6
5    2,027    6.6
6    636  1.5
7  2,079  4.4
8  -256   -0.3
9   -47    -0.1
10   -13,308   -5.8
Compared to Table 3, the tax is modestly less regressive.  However it continues to look very
regressive.  The Suits Index for the sales tax with rebate is -0.155 indicating considerable
regressivity (relative to the income tax system it replaces for which the Suits Index equals 0.202).  
The story changes dramatically when I rank people by lifetime income (see Table 7 below).  Now
there is no clear pattern to the change in average tax rates.  The change ranges from a decrease of
2 percent (decile 8) to an increase of 2.2 percent (decile 1).    Ranking households by lifetime
income the Suits Index for the sales tax with rebate (0.054) is nearly the same as for the current
income tax (0.068).    Issues of fairness in the transition may still exist.
14
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Table 7. Distribution of a Broad Based
Retail Sales Tax with Universal Rebates:
Lifetime Basis
Decile Change in Tax Change in
Liability Average Tax
Rate
1  442    2.2
2 426    1.5
3  -260  -0.9
4    110    0.2
5    419    0.8
6  29  0.04
7  1  0.1
8  -1,272   -2.0
9   -164   -0.3
10  267  0.1 
If you compare Table 4 to Table 7, it is easy to see that rebates based on the poverty
threshold can offset any remaining regressive aspects of a national sales tax when ranking
households by a measure of lifetime income.  These results indicate that it is not impossible to
structure a consumption tax that is broadly progressive . 
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IVC.  Rebating the Payroll Tax
A universal rebate may be viewed as too expansive a program and that tax relief should be
more narrowly targeted to lower income workers.  In this section, I consider a broad based retail
sales tax coupled with a refund of the employer and employee contributions for payroll taxes up-20-
to $2,000 per worker.  I first estimate for each earner in the sample the rebate that he or she is
eligible for.  For example a household with two workers that pay $1800 and $600 in employee
payroll taxes would be eligible for a rebate of $3200.  The worker that paid $1800 in payroll tax
also has attributed $1800 in employer contributions on her account for a total of $3600 in payroll
taxes.  She would be eligible for a rebate of $2000.  Similarly, the worker with $600 in employee
contributions would have attributed an additional $600 of employer contributions.  The entire
$1200 of payroll taxes would be rebated.   Results are shown for annual income incidence
measures in Table 8.   The reform continues to look quite regressive with average tax rates within
deciles falling on average and the top 30% of the income distribution benefitting from the reform
at the expense of the lowest 70% of the distribution.  The Suits Index is -0.222, not substantially
different than the index for the broad based sales tax.-21-
Table 8. Distribution of a Broad Based
Retail Sales Tax with $2,000 per worker
Payroll Tax Rebate: Annual Basis
Decile Change in Tax Change in
Liability Average Tax
Rate
1    3,252   81.9
2    3,368 28.8
3    3,266   18.8
4    2,775   11.2
5    2,155    7.5
6     227    0.2
7    1,532    3.3
8    -957   -1.5
9   -1,152   -1.5
10 -14,450   -6.6
Table 9 provides results for the lifetime analysis.  Again the lifetime incidence approach
mitigates but does not eliminate the regressivity of the tax.  Average tax rates within lifetime
income deciles do not fall monotonically, but the top half of the lifetime income distribution
benefits from the reform while the lower half (save the third decile) faces higher taxes.  Now the
Suits Index equals 0.016 (compared to 0.068 for the income tax) indicating a slight though by no
means large regressive shift in distribution due to the tax reform.-22-
Table 9. Distribution of a Broad Based
Retail Sales Tax with $2,000 per worker
Payroll Tax Rebate: Lifetime Basis
Decile Change in Tax Change in
Liability Average Tax
Rate
1   1,319    6.8
2    956    3.5
3    -42   -0.2
4    169    0.4
5    375    0.7
6    -21   -0.1
7   -121   -0.2
8  -1,653   -2.7
9   -679   -1.0
10   -302   -0.5
V. Conclusion
The results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that a shift from the current income tax to a broad
based retail sales tax would be a regressive shift whether measured on an annual or a lifetime
income basis.  However, the analysis using annual income dramatically overstates the regressivity
of the shift.  Various efforts to add progressivity to the tax system can mitigate against
regressivity.  In particular, a national sales tax with a universal rebate based on poverty thresholds
looks nearly as progressive as the current income tax system when households are ranked by a
measure of lifetime income.  I also considered an approach that rebates payroll tax contributions
and found that it does not reduce regressivity substantially, probably due to the fact that many-23-
poor people do not earn incomes sufficient to pay substantial payroll taxes that can then be
rebated.  However, this proposal might be attractive when viewed in a larger context.  First, the
payroll rebate has the advantage of targeting aid to the working poor and can be viewed as a
replacement for the Earned Income Tax Credit.  Second, non-working poor continue to be
eligible for welfare benefits and the payroll tax credit can be viewed as an auxiliary subsidy for
those poor not eligible for welfare.
What is the practical importance of these results given the common objection that people
are not strictly speaking operating according to a lifetime budget constraint?  Liquidity
constraints, for example, would render the lifetime income approach objectionable.  While it may
be reasonable to criticize the lifetime incidence approach as making heroic assumptions about
people's ability to make consumption decisions at any point in time based on their lifetime pattern
of income, it is equally reasonable to criticize the annual income approach for ignoring any
savings and asset accumulation that allows consumption to depend on income at other points in
time.   Thus, one might reasonable think of incidence analyses as falling along a continuum with a
strict annual income approach at one end of the continuum and a strict lifetime income approach
at the other end.  Truth lies somewhere in between and while the regressivity of a shift from the
income tax to a broad based retail sales tax may be more regressive than when measured using a
lifetime income approach, it is surely less regressive than when measured with an annual income
approach.  The results in this paper suggest that when evaluating the merits of major tax reform
(in particular, a shift from income taxation to a national sales tax) that one should not focus
unduly on the distributional considerations discussed in this paper.  Rather, one might better focus
on the efficiency gains possible under realistic implementations of a national sales tax, along with  See the analysis by L. Kotlikoff summarized in a Cato Institute Policy Analysis (1993).
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administrative considerations and transitional issues. 
There are important distributional considerations that I have not considered in this
analysis.  Transitional gains and losses will be substantial in any tax reform and in particular a
reform that shifts from income to consumption taxation.  A shift without any transitional rules
from income taxation to a national sales tax will induce a transfer from the current elderly to the
current young.   How one deals with the transition is an important topic but beyond the scope of
15








Appendix A - Measuring Lifetime Income
 In this appendix, I sketch out the model with which I estimate lifetime income.  This
approach is based on Caspersen and Metcalf (1994).  Lifetime income (W) can be computed
either as the present discounted value of the stream of inheritances (and gifts) received (I) plus t
earned income and transfers (E) or as the present discounted value of consumption (C) and t t
bequests made (B): t
    (1)
where D is the individual's after tax rate of return.  I will construct a measure of lifetime income
from the sources side.  That is, I will estimate the stream of earned income and inheritances for
households and compute the present discounted value of this stream.
I use the income profiles constructed in Caspersen and Metcalf (1994) to compute lifetime
income in the CES for this study.  The income measures from the Caspersen and Metcalf income
profiles are updated to 1994 dollars using the CPI.   Lifetime income is defined here as the present
discounted value of earned income, transfers, and gifts received by a given family over the adult
life of the household head and depends only on the demographic variables associated with each
family.  This measure assumes that the individual's discount rate remains constant at 4 percent
over time and that a household exists as an income generating entity from the time the head is 21
until the time the head is 80.  Workers are continually employed until age 65 at which point they










  I use the regression with imputed fixed effects in Caspersen and Metcalf.  
16
   The annual equivalent (Y) is given by the formula 
17
Y =  , when D is the interest rate and T the length of contract. 
   There is considerable evidence of skew in the distribution of income (e.g. Lillard
18
(1977)).  Large positive skew indicates outliers with large income.  If consumption is less skewed
than income, income skew will drive down average tax burdens in the top decile.
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(2)  
where Y  is the fitted value of earned income plus transfers and inheritances received for
^
it
household i in year t from the regression in Caspersen and Metcalf.   Additional adjustments to
16
the lifetime income measure are detailed below.  I annualize my lifetime income measure by
computing the 60-year annual constant annuity that can be obtained in a fair market for this
amount of wealth at a 4 percent real rate of interest.  
17
I make two adjustments to the income profiles described above.  The first adjustment is an
attempt to generate an income distribution that more accurately reflects measured income
distributions.  The second adjustment attempts to recover the fixed effect from the PSID
regression that is lost in the process of fitting the PSID regression to CES data. 
In forecasting income in the CES I would like to eliminate randomness in the income
measure that is due to annual temporary income fluctuations while maintaining the stochastic
elements of income that affect variance and skew in a persistent way.   I make an adjustment to
18
my measure of lifetime income as characterized in equation (2) to account for the loss of skew by
allowing for shocks to income that are persistent over time.  I assume an AR(1) process for a   There is substantial evidence of large uncertainty in earned income (e.g. Abowd and
19
Card (1979)) as well as high persistence in shocks to earnings (e.g. Parsons (1978)).  My
parameter choices follow those of Engen and Gale (1993)).
   Another way to think of the estimated individual effect is that it is the combination of
20
unobservable individual characteristics (e.g. taste, ability) and observable characteristics (e.g.
education).
-27-
random shock to log income with first-order auto-correlation of .85 and variance of the
innovation of .05.   This will add skew to the distribution of lifetime income.     
19
My measure of lifetime income comes from a regression in the PSID which measures a
fixed effect.  To preserve the fixed effect in the CES, I incorporate a proxy for the individual
effect from the CES based on an auxiliary regression.  I add to the annualized measure a fraction
of the residual from an instrumental variables regression in the CES of current consumption on
age, age squared, and education dummies.  This residual incorporates additional information
about lifetime income contained in current consumption after controlling for age and educational
characteristics.  The fraction is set so that the variance of the residual equals the variance of the
fixed effect from a fixed effects regression in the PSID.
This procedure can be viewed as a variation on a method for identifying time-invariant
effects in a fixed effects regression proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981).  Hausman and
Taylor point out that the estimated individual effect is a combination of a true individual effect
and the effect of time-invariant variables on the  dependent variable.   In certain circumstances, it
20
is possible to identify the parameters of the time invariant variables.  To disentangle the two
effects, they suggest regressing estimated fixed effects on the time-invariant variables. 
Recognizing that the fixed effect may be correlated with some of the time invariant variables,
Hausman and Taylor note the need for instruments for the exogenous time-invariant variables.-28-
In my case, current consumption itself is used as a proxy for the estimated individual
effect.  I proceed by assuming that education is correlated with the true fixed effect and
instrument for the education dummies with race, sex, region and smoker dummy variables.  The
last variable is a dummy variable for the presence of expenditures in the CES on tobacco
products.  Table A1 reports results from the IV regression on log current consumption. 
Consumption increases with education through college graduation and is hump shaped with
respect to income.  The regression provides a reasonably good fit and the coefficients are
generally significant at the 95 percent level.  















Number of Observations 1529
Standard Error 0.701  The income classes were 5000 to 10000, 10000 to 15000, 15000 to 20000, 20000 to
21
30000, 30000 to 40000, 40000 to 50000, 50000 to 75000 and above 75000.
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Appendix B - Adjustments to Consumer Expenditure Survey Data
I. Attributing Health Care Spending to Individuals
While the bulk of spending on health care is done on behalf of households by insurance
companies and health care organizations, the CES only records out of pocket spending by 
households.   Moreover, this spending can often be negative if the household has received a
refund from an insurance company for medical spending in the current survey period.  Therefore,
I exclude the out of pocket spending recorded in the CES and replace it with a prediction of
spending on behalf of a household using data from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES), a nationally representative sample that followed spending by roughly 20,000 families in
1987.  Total medical spending for a household is the sum of employer provided and individual
health insurance, out of pocket spending, and spending reimbursed by government insurance
(Medicare, and Medicaid).  The 1987 data are inflated to 1994 values using the NIPA aggregates
for the two years.  I regressed total medical spending on income indicator variables , an indicator
21
variable for the presence of elderly family members, an indicator for the presence of children
under the age of 18, and family size.  The coefficients are precisely estimated with the expected
signs.  I then forecast income in the CES using the estimated coefficients and replaced the medical
related spending in the CES with this forecasted value.
II.   Imputing Corporate Tax Liabilities to Individuals
I follow the methodology set out in Feldstein (1988) to impute corporate tax liabilities to
individuals.  The approach compute two numbers: 1) the ratio of corporate taxes to total capital-30-
income (2) and 2) the ratio of pretax corporate profits to dividends (µ).  Under the assumption
that corporate income taxes are borne by all capital income, 2 represents the average tax rate on
capital income.  Taxes on corporate income are taxes on distributed and non-distributed profits. 
This method assumes that corporate profits associated with an individual are proportional to
dividends received.  Thus µ gives the mark-up to associate corporate profits with households.
Capital income (K) is the sum of corporate profits (C), net interest received by households
(I), and rental income (R).  Once I compute K and its components along with the corporate tax
liability (T) and personal dividends (D), I can compute 2 and µ:
2 = T/K
µ = C/D
Pretax corporate profits are the sum of NIPA corporate profits plus the decrease in the value of
corporate debt resulting from inflation plus real interest earned by pension funds.
NIPA corporate profits (excluding Federal Reserve Bank profits) equaled $506.0 billion in
1994.  Credit market instrument liabilities of the corporate sector equaled $2,627.4 billion (Flow
of Funds).  The inflation rate for 1994 based on the CPI was 2.6%.  Thus corporate profits should
be increased by (.026)($2,627.4) = $68.3 billion.  
Interest income received by pension funds equaled $57.6 billion.  To convert to real
interest income, I use nominal interest rates weighted by holdings of pension funds and convert
using the inflation rate (B).  The holdings are:-31-
Holding Amount Percentage Interest Rate Source
Time 116.9 15.7 3.0% FRB source;
Deposits, etc. assumed based
on various rates
Money Funds 31.2 4.2 4.9% 6 mo.
Commercial
Paper
Govt Bonds 362.5 48.7 7.1% 10 yr G bonds
Corp Bonds 233.4 31.4 8.6% Baa Bonds
This implies a nominal interest rate (D) of 6.8%.  The real rate (r) is given by (1+D)/(1+B)-1 which
in this case equals 4.1%.  The adjuster to convert nominal interest into real interest is the ratio of
real to nominal interest: 4.1/6.8 = .602.  Thus, real pension interest income is (.602)(57.6) = $34.7
billion.  Corporate profits are the sum of reported corporate profits (506.0), the decrease in
corporate debt due to inflation (68.3), and real pension interest income (34.7) for a total of
$609.0 billion.
Interest received by households from NIPA is $661.6 billion.  This is converted to real
interest by the same method as pension interest income.  The interest rate weights are based on
holdings of households in Flow of Funds:-32-
Holding Amount Percentage Interest Rate Source
Time 2994.8 64.8 3.0% FRB source;
Deposits, etc. assumed based
on various rates
Money Funds 352.2 7.6 4.9% 6 mo.
Commercial
Paper
Govt Bonds 925.8 20.0 7.1% 10 yr G bonds
Corp Bonds 346.3 7.5 8.6% Baa Bonds
This gives a nominal interest rate of 4.4% and a real interest rate of 1.8%.  Thus real personal
interest income is (1.8/4.4)(661.6) = $263.8 billion.
Personal interest expenses (excluding mortgage interest) is $117.2 billion.  The nominal
interest rate is based on:
Holding Amount Percentage Interest Rate Source
Consumer Credit 990.2 59.2 15.7% credit card rates
in FRB
Misc. Debt 681.9 40.8 9.2% Prime Rate + 2%
This gives a nominal interest rate of 13.0%, a real rate of 10.1% and an adjustment factor of .780. 
Thus real interest expenses are (.780)(117.2) = $91.4 billion.  Net real interest income is the
difference of real interest income (263.8) and real interest expenses (91.4) or $172.4 billion.
Finally, rental income in the NIPA tables is 116.6 billion.  Capital income (K) is the sum or
corporate income (609.0), net real interest income (172.4) and rental income (116.6) for a total of
$898.0 billion.
Corporate tax liabilities come from the NIPA tables and equal $144.0 billion in 1994. -33-
Personal Dividends  (D) are the NIPA dividends paid to persons (211.0) less dividends
attributable to pension funds (26.3) or $184.7 billion.
The average tax rate on corporate income (2) is the ratio of corporate tax collections to
capital income and equals 144.0/898.0 or .160.  The ratio of pretax corporate profits to dividends
(µ) equals 609.0/184.7 or 3.30.  Finally, pretax corporate profits per dollar of dividends
distributed equals 2µ = .528.  Finally, I use the adjusters for underreporting that Feldstein uses for
dividends (.71) and interest income (.82).  Thus my formula for attributing corporate tax liability
is
Corporate Tax Liability  = .528*Div/.71 + .160*Int/.82 + .160*Rent.-34-
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